There's something that for me as a physicist seems unsettling, I might be missing things though. Namely, it is that science seems to progress through falsification of ontologies. You mention it but to me it appears to be lost in further consideration.
It is not that we choose from which arrangement of concepts we can formulate a theory that through some approach gives us best predictions. This I would call engineering.
It is that science is a process of disregarding the concepts, the axioms as unfitting for description of observations.
So the hard problem seems to be in how the structure of (new) evidence leads to new ontologies.
Hey Richard. I'm still getting a hang of Garrabrant induction, but do any of these methods address how different epistemologies accept different observations as valid? I'm wondering where the "theory-ladennes" of observations fits into all this and whether you've explored this direction.
There's something that for me as a physicist seems unsettling, I might be missing things though. Namely, it is that science seems to progress through falsification of ontologies. You mention it but to me it appears to be lost in further consideration.
It is not that we choose from which arrangement of concepts we can formulate a theory that through some approach gives us best predictions. This I would call engineering.
It is that science is a process of disregarding the concepts, the axioms as unfitting for description of observations.
So the hard problem seems to be in how the structure of (new) evidence leads to new ontologies.
Hey Richard. I'm still getting a hang of Garrabrant induction, but do any of these methods address how different epistemologies accept different observations as valid? I'm wondering where the "theory-ladennes" of observations fits into all this and whether you've explored this direction.